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Abstract in English 
The expected increase in the ratio of retirees to workers that is due to population ageing is sure 
to increase pressure on public finances and the Dutch economy in the coming decades. 
However, because of the uncertainty regarding future demographic developments, the exact 
extent of the problem is unknown. This paper presents stochastic simulations, i.e. simulations 
that combine the CGE model of the Dutch economy GAMMA with stochastic population 
projections. 
Key words: Demographic Uncertainty, Public Finance, Stochastic Simulations. 
JEL codes: C68, H68, J11 
 
Abstract in Dutch 
Doordat de verhouding gepensioneerden/werkers als gevolg van de vergrijzing toeneemt, is er 
een groeiende druk van de overheidsfinanciën op de Nederlandse economie. De demografische 
ontwikkelingen zijn onzeker waardoor de exacte omvang van deze groeiende druk onbekend is. 
Dit Discussion Paper doet verslag van stochastische simulaties met een algemeen-
evenwichtsmodel van de Nederlandse economie (GAMMA) waarmee stochastische 
bevolkingsprojecties worden doorgerekend. 
 
Steekwoorden: Demografische onzekerheid, Overheidsfinanciën, Stochastische simulaties. 
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Summary 
The expected increase in the ratio of retirees to workers that is due to population ageing is sure 
to increase pressure on public finances and the Dutch economy in the coming decades. 
However, because of the uncertainty regarding future demographic developments, the exact 
extent of the problem is unknown. This paper presents stochastic simulations, i.e. simulations 
that combine the CGE model of the Dutch economy GAMMA with stochastic population 
projections. Stochastic simulation analysis produces frequency distributions rather than point 
estimates. This allows a specification of confidence intervals for vital statistics, like the elderly 
dependency ratio, public expenditures on health care and pensions, public revenues and finally, 
the sustainability gap, a measure for the indebtedness of the government. Moreover, the paper 
presents frequency distributions for three different policies that restore fiscal sustainability, 
namely a reduction of public expenditure, an increase of the rate of consumption taxation and 
an increase of the rate of labour income taxation. As the three policies differ in the degree to 
which they distort the labour market, their frequency distributions have different shapes. 
 
 
   9 
1  Introduction 
As with other European countries, the effects of population ageing on the sustainability of 
public finances in the Netherlands are well documented. Two recent studies, Van Ewijk et al. 
(2006) and European Commission (2006), conclude that current fiscal arrangements are 
inadequate to cope with the pressures that will be caused by the expected increase in the 
proportion of retirees to working-aged individuals in the coming decades. While there is little 
doubt that reforms must be implemented, the exact extent of the required policy adjustments is 
subject to uncertainty. 
Uncertainties that are relevant for making fiscal projections may be broadly classified into 
two categories: economic uncertainties (regarding productivity growth, interest rates, labour 
participation etc.) and demographic uncertainties (regarding rates of fertility, mortality and net 
immigration). While economic uncertainties are mostly given ample attention, demographic 
uncertainties are often neglected. In a long-term analysis, demographic uncertainties may be 
equally relevant however. An analysis that deals exclusively with demographic uncertainties 
may contribute to correcting this imbalance. 
Traditionally, projections that deal with (demographic) uncertainty distinguish between 
different scenarios: for example, high, medium and low variants. This approach suffers from a 
number of shortcomings (Lee and Tuljapurkar (2001)). Different scenarios assume perfect 
correlation of shocks over time and perfect (positive or negative) correlation between different 
variables. In addition, since they do not refer to the distribution of variables, it is difficult to 
select scenarios that have a similar likelihood of occurrence. Actually, the likelihood of any 
scenario is almost zero in a statistical sense, rendering the whole exercise difficult to give a 
proper interpretation. 
In recent years, the field of statistical demography has developed an alternative to scenario 
analysis in the form of stochastic population forecasting (Alho (1990), Lee (1992)). This 
technique can be used to solve the shortcomings of the traditional approach. On top of that, the 
technique of stochastic simulations can say something about the expected value of a variable 
that is nonlinearly linked to demographic variables - information that cannot be obtained from a 
scenario approach. It is true that stochastic simulation analysis is more demanding, as it requires 
researchers to make explicit their assumptions about the joint frequency distribution of 
exogenous variables. This should be considered an advantage, though, as it renders the 
projection exercises more transparent. 
This paper combines the computable general equilibrium model of the Dutch economy 
GAMMA with stochastic population projections. This enables us to produce predictive 
distributions not only for demographic variables like the size and the age structure of the 
population, but also for economic variables like GDP or fiscal variables like expenditure on 
health care or pensions. These predictive distributions can be given a probabilistic interpretation 
(Lee and Anderson (2005), Weale (2007)). If applicable, we will plot these distributions as a   10 
function of time, producing a number of illustrative ‘fan charts’ (Lee and Tuljapurkar (2001), 
Celasun et al. (2007)). 
The GAMMA model is a behavioural model that incorporates the consumption-saving and 
labour-leisure decisions of households. This distinguishes the GAMMA model from standard 
generational accounting (GA) models, which are more often used to assess the implications of 
ageing populations. The relevance of this is that using stochastic forecasts in GAMMA may 
produce more realistic outcomes than they would in a GA framework. This is true in particular 
when policy changes are investigated that impact the households’ saving or labour supply 
decisions. (See Draper et al. (2006) for a more detailed discussion of CGE models like 
GAMMA and GA models.) This paper will illustrate this for the case of predictive distributions 
for tax rate changes. 
In using GAMMA to conduct this analysis, a balance was struck between realism and 
tractability. We wanted to concentrate on the effects of demographic uncertainty and so, in 
choosing a model that is otherwise deterministic, the simulation outcomes are to some extent 
stylized. Nonetheless, we consider this approach to be a reasonable first-order representation of 
the issues involved and a vast improvement over the traditional method of conducting scenario 
analyses with non-behavioural accounting models. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the relevant details of the 
GAMMA model and explains how it is integrated with the stochastic forecasting program PEP. 
Sections 3 and 4 present our predictive distributions. Section 3 focuses on demography and 
section 4 discusses the development of public finances. Section 5 presents results that relate to 
the sustainability gap - a statistic that measures the policy adjustment required to sustain public 
finances indefinitely. Section 6 concludes the paper with a brief discussion. A supplementary 
collection of tables of summary statistics is given in the appendix.   11 
2  PEP and the GAMMA model 
We derive demographic data from two distinct sources. Fertility, mortality and net immigration 
rates in the baseline projection are taken from Statistics Netherlands (CBS). The deviations of 
these variables in typical stochastic demographic simulations from their counterparts in baseline 
simulation are taken from the PEP program (Program for Error Propagation), developed by 
Juho Alho and Bruce Spencer. 
2.1  PEP 
The PEP program applies random shock processes to the rates of change of fertility, mortality 
and net immigration.
1 The values of parameters are chosen such that the model mimics 
historical forecast errors made in population predictions. 
Fertility, mortality and net immigration are modelled as independent from one another. 
Furthermore, demographic developments are assumed to be independent of economic variables. 
The stochastic population model can be described as follows.
2 Let  ( ) t j R ,  denote the value of a 
vital demographic process (such as the fertility, mortality or net immigration rate) for age j in 
the forecast year t > 0. Then: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) t j X t j r t j R , , ˆ exp , + =  
 
where  ( ) t j r , ˆ  represents a given point forecast and  ( ) t j X ,  represents the error process. The 
error process takes the form  ( ) ( ) ( ) t j j t j X , ... 1 , , e e + + =  with error increments: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) t j t j S t j j , , , d h e + =  
 
( ) t j S , >0 are scaling weights that replicate the increase in the variance of the error increments 
through time. The term  j h  represents the error in the forecasted trend and  ( ) t j, d  represents 
random fluctuations around the trend which are assumed independent over time for each j. The 
variables  j h  and  ( ) t j, d  are assumed to be independent of each other and: 
 
( ), , 0 ~ j j N k h ( ) ( ) j N t j k d - 1 , 0 ~ ,  
 




1 The PEP program does not model immigration and emigration separately; instead, it models net immigration.. 
2 This description draws on Alho and Spencer (1997).   12 
( ) ( ) d h r d d r h h = = j i j i Corr Corr , , ,  
 
with  , 1 £ k r   d h, = k .  
 
So to run PEP, the user must specify, for each vital rate, a point forecast ( ) t j r , ˆ , the values of the 
scaling factors  ( ) t j S , and the values of the parameters  j k ,  h r  and  k r . As stated above, the 
point forecasts are taken from the CBS. The model parameters that determine the stochastic 
processes are taken from the UPE (Uncertain Population of Europe) project
3 and apply 
specifically to the Netherlands. While the scale of the assumed errors in forecasting are based 
on the expert judgement of the model builders, they are not the result of a statistical estimation 
procedure.  
The output of the stochastic processes are cohort-specific estimates of fertility rates (for 
females aged 15 to 49), mortality rates (for males and females aged 0 to 99) and net 
immigration rates (for males and females aged 0 to 99) extending 50 years into the future. The 
structure of the model is such that the logarithms of fertility rates, the logarithms of mortality 
rates and the rates of net immigration are normally distributed. This procedure is considered to 
be a conservative characterization of the uncertainty surrounding future demographic 
developments, in that catastrophic events such as pandemics or a third world war are not 
considered. On that account, demographic uncertainty may be underestimated. 
While PEP produces population forecasts that extend 50 years into the future, our economic 
model, GAMMA, requires demographic input covering 200 years. To bridge this difference we 
extrapolate the stochastic processes of PEP forward by fixing all fertility rates, mortality rates 
and net immigration rates in the period 2057-2205 to their 2056 values. This ensures that in 
each projection, the population growth rate converges to a constant and the elderly dependency 
ratio stabilizes in the long run. This assumption satisfies a technical requirement of the 
simulation procedure; that a steady state is reached in the final years of the projection period. 
2.2  GAMMA 
GAMMA is an applied general equilibrium (AGE) model of the Netherlands that features 
overlapping generations of households and a thorough elaboration of the interaction between 
the private and public sector based on generational accounting (GA) principles.
4 Like other 
AGE models in the Auerbach-Kotlikoff tradition (1987), GAMMA accounts for feedback 
mechanisms caused by household behavioural responses to policy reforms. Using a GA 
framework enables far-sighted assessments to be made of the effects of demographic changes 
 
3 See http://www.stat.fi/tup/euupe/del12.pdf. 
4 For a detailed technical description of GAMMA, see Draper and Armstrong (2007).   13 
on the sustainability of public finances and the pension system. In this way, GAMMA combines 
the best aspects of AGE and GA models. 
Each household in GAMMA is represented by a finitely-lived adult whose economic behaviour 
is guided according to life-cycle theory. Households maximize their expected lifetime utility 
subject to a budget constraint by choosing a time path of total consumption. Lifetime 
expenditure is constrained by total wealth, which equals the sum of financial wealth and the 
discounted value of potential future labour and pension income.
5 Total consumption consists of 
both commodity and leisure consumption, so the labour supply decision results from the 
household utility maximization problem as well. Taste shift parameters that determine the 
leisure and goods consumption preferences for each age cohort are calibrated with estimated 
lifetime consumption and labour profiles of the Netherlands. Agents have perfect foresight; that 
is, their expectations coincide with realisations. Lifetime uncertainty is recognised, but perfect 
capital markets enable households to insure against this type of risk.
6 
GAMMA considers the Dutch economy to be small relative to the outside world. In 
particular, goods produced at home are perfectly substitutable with those produced abroad, so 
commodity prices are determined by the global market. Domestic policies do not affect the 
interest rate, which is determined on world capital markets. Production takes place with labour 
and capital according to a CES production technology. The model assumes a perfect labour 
market: wage accommodation takes place without any delay. The productivity of labour is 
assumed to depend on age. Otherwise labour supplied by households of different ages is 
homogeneous. Capital also adjusts without any delay. 
The modelling of the public sector is different from the other actors in the model 
(households, firms, pension funds) in that its behavioural relations are more or less automatic 
rather than derived from some optimization problem. This approach is quite obvious when the 
analysis aims at assessing the sustainability of current fiscal policies or when it aims at 
exploring the effects of certain changes in public policies. Alternative approaches exist 
however. See for example, Celasun et al. (2007) for an analysis that explicitly accounts for 
fiscal reaction functions. 
Revenues for the public sector consist of contributions to the public pension scheme and 
receipts from profit, income and indirect taxation. Expenditures on age-sensitive items such as 
health care, education and public pensions have their own age profiles so aggregate 
expenditures on these items develop from year to year accordingly along with demographic 
changes. In addition they grow over time in proportion to the wage rate. In contrast, all 
individuals are assumed to receive the same benefit from spending on non-age-sensitive items 
like defence and public administration. On the aggregate level, these expenditures rise with 
GDP. 
 
5 Potential labour income is defined as income with labour time equal to the total available time. 
6 Longevity risk is assumed to be diversified; each household receives an annuity from a life insurance company in return for 
bequeathing it its remaining assets upon death (Yaari (1965).   14 
GAMMA distinguishes also supplementary (second-pillar) pension schemes. This is important 
for fiscal reasons: pension premiums can be deducted from income before taxes are determined, 
while pension benefits are taxed. Furthermore, the pension scheme may (positively or 
negatively) affect labour supply decisions. Indeed, the pension scheme is a defined benefit 
scheme that makes transfers between generations. Premiums and benefits from private pensions 
are income-dependent. 
Demographic developments in GAMMA are modelled according to an overlapping 
generational structure. Households begin their economic lives at age twenty and can potentially 
live to be 99 years old. Cohort sizes from year to year are determined by the jump-off 
population in the base year and the age-specific rates of fertility, mortality and net immigration 
in the years from the base year onwards. We have taken the jump-off population from the CBS. 
The rest of the data are obtained from the CBS and the PEP files, as described above. 
2.3  PEP and GAMMA 
A final remark on the connection between the demographic and economic parts of the model 
concerns the perfect foresight of economic agents. Within each simulation, agent have perfect 
information about future events. For example, households are fully aware of future fiscal 
policies. The same holds true for firms and the pension sector which are also perfectly forward-
looking. In each of the stochastic paths, the second-pillar pension contribution rate adjusts to 
reflect demographic developments in future years. To some extent, this will affect household 
decisions years before the developments materialize and thus there may be some bias in 
savings/consumption behaviour in the simulations. 
The incorporation of fully-rational behaviour instead of perfect foresight would probably 
have seemed somewhat less ad hoc, but would have required a complete reconstructing of the 
model and this is clearly beyond the scope of this paper. Moreover, it is an open question 
whether this would change the spread of the predictive distributions to an important degree. 
Alho and Määtänen (2007) find, for instance, that the welfare consequences to households of 
ignoring aggregate mortality risk are fairly small, which suggests that behavioural economic 
reactions in response to aggregate demographic uncertainty may not matter that much.   15 
3  Size and age structure of the population 
It is well-known that the Netherlands, in addition to many other countries, faces an ageing 
population. The situation has been brought about by a combination of factors. Notably, the baby 
boom which accompanied the rapid expansion of the economy following the Second World 
War was itself followed by a “baby bust” that still continues today. Fertility rates remain 
persistently low, although not as low as in many other European countries. Compounding this 
effect was the steady decrease in mortality rates attributable to advances in life-extending 
technologies and improvements in overall environmental factors including diet and hygiene. It 
is significant that the scales of both developments in fertility and mortality were quite 
unexpected. Indeed the ex-post assessment of demographic projections made over the last 
century has exposed that systematic errors had been made by forecasters (see Keilman, Cruijsen 
and Alho (2007)). 
It is not unreasonable to suppose that we are equally ignorant about the demographic 
evolution of the Netherlands in the coming years. Table 3.1 quantifies this ignorance by 
presenting the means and standard deviations of the distributions of the vital demographic rates 
and resulting life expectancies at birth for males and females taken from 359 PEP simulation 
runs. 359 simulations is considered a sufficient number to produce well-behaved distributions. 
Previous studies that coupled GAMMA and PEP relied on between 200 and 250 simulations. 
We have found that increasing the number of simulations above 250 does not have a significant 
effect on the distributional outcomes. The 359 simulations where taken from an initial run of 
501 simulations, of which 37 did not solve. 
The other 105 simulations were omitted due to extremely high population results. In these 
projections, the exponential effect of high fertility rates in the steady state resulted in total 
populations for the Netherlands of more than 100 million by 2205, a figure that confronts 
common sense notions about the physical capacity of the Netherlands. Furthermore, a strong 
majority of these projections featured steady-state growth rates that exceeded the marginal 
product of capital, indicating that the economy in each of these cases was dynamically 
inefficient. While dynamic inefficiency is a theoretical possibility, empirical evidence has 
shown that it has not occurred historically, even in countries with very high savings rates (see 
Abel et al.(1989)). 
In the real world, we would expect that as population levels become so high that there would 
be a behavioural feedback effect from this congestion on population growth. If the growth was 
localized to the Netherlands, either fertility would decrease or emigration would increase.
7 If 
the growth was a more global phenomenon, expectations of a rise in the rate of change of future 
demand for output would increase desired capital investment and put upward pressure on 
interest rates, thereby buffering against a move towards dynamic inefficiency. Unfortunately, 
 
7 For example, a survey by Lee (1987) finds that estimated elasticities of fertility with respect to population densities are 
overwhelmingly negative.   16 
these sorts of endogeneity are beyond the current state of the model and we chose to settle for 
simply omitting these 105 simulations from our sample. An alternative solution to the problem 
would have been to endogenize the net migration rate in a mechanical way within the 
demographic model in order to achieve lower net population growth rates. However this would 
have required assumptions that are as equally ad hoc as eliminating the extreme projections.  
According to the mean estimates, by 2050 the average death rate will exceed the average 
birth rate, implying that the natural rate of increase will be negative.
8 However, this will be 
compensated for, to some degree, by an expected rise in the average net immigration rate. Note 
that the mean estimates of life expectancies are quite stable in contrast to the upward trend 
predicted by many demographers (see Lee and Carter (1992)). This is due to the more 
conservative projections produced by the CBS that are used for the point forecasts here. The 
main message of the table, though, is that this projection is subject to considerable uncertainty 
according to the standard deviations of the rate distributions. Taking into account the forecast 
errors that the PEP program mimics, some doubt is cast on whether the population of the 
Netherlands will increase or decrease in the coming decades as we show below. 
Table 3.1  Summary statistics - demographic rates
a and life expectancies 
  2010  2020  2030  2040  2050 
Birth rate           
 - average  10.85  10.61  10.71  10.07  10.06 
 - standard deviation  0.65  1.44  2.23  2.49  2.89 
Net immigration rate           
 - average  0.41  0.73  1.20  1.62  1.96 
 - standard deviation  1.35  1.88  1.83  1.84  1.93 
Death rate           
 - average  8.76  9.99  11.63  13.19  13.68 
 - standard deviation  0.46  1.00  1.56  1.78  1.84 
Life expectancy - males           
 - average  78.25  78.93  79.34  79.57  79.76 
 - standard deviation  0.59  1.32  2.09  2.70  3.38 
Life expectancy - females           
 - average  82.05  82.53  82.76  82.72  82.58 
 - standard deviation  0.58  1.29  2.04  2.67  3.27 
            a 




8 In fact, all the demographic rates are cohort-specific. Here we report them averaged over the entire population. As 
explained in section 2, PEP applies stochastic shocks to rates of mortality and net immigration for all cohorts and rates of 
fertility for female cohorts aged 15 to 49. Instead of the average fertility rate, here we report the birth rate (total births/total 
population) in order to make a transparent comparison with the other two rates.    17 
Viewed in isolation, it is difficult to say how the predictive distributions of each of these 
demographic rates will influence the make-up of the population in the years ahead.  For 
example, we may want to know whether a misestimation of future fertility rates would be more 
consequential to the forecast than a misestimation of mortality rates. However, the relative 
importance of variations in fertility, mortality and immigration rates on the demographic 
structure are difficult to disentangle. In the case of the present situation, it is tempting to 
characterize the ageing of the population as a consequence mainly of past changes in fertility: 
either the baby boom or the subsequent bust. However, the longevity of the baby-boomers is an 
essential ingredient in the approaching demographic imbalance. The interdependence of fertility 
rates and mortality rates on the demographic structure applies equally to projections into the 
future. Any attempt to commit ourselves to a thought experiment that aims at isolating the 
effects of one of the rates is flawed since it would still require some ad hoc assumption to be 
made about the other two. 
We leave this matter aside to concentrate on the predictive distribution of demographic 
structures generated by these rates. Figure 3.1 illustrates by showing our ‘fan chart’ of the 
population size: a time series of population distributions of the Netherlands for the years 2008 
to 2058. The line labelled ‘base scenario’ denotes the point estimate (shock-free) forecast. The 
lines labelled 90%, 80%, 50%, 20% and 10% are trend lines indicating the ninetieth, eightieth, 
fiftieth, twentieth and tenth percentiles of the forecasts. They do not correspond to single paths 
of the PEP simulations; rather the range between the lines 90% and 10% may be interpreted as 
an 80% confidence region for the population forecast for any given year. Likewise, the region 
between the lines 80% and 20% corresponds to a 60% confidence region. The 50% line 
corresponds to the median forecast.   
As one can see, the median and baseline forecasts deviate only little and the predictive 
distribution is quite symmetric.
9 However, even this slight difference illustrates the way in 
which stochastic simulations enhance the analysis. The interpretation of the deterministic (point 
forecast) projection is that, over the next fifty years, the population will increase slightly. 
Conversely, the interpretation of the stochastic projections is that it is actually just about an 
even bet whether the total population will increase or decrease over that time. 
For our purposes, a more informative demographic statistic than the total population is the 
elderly dependency ratio, the ratio of the number of retirees to the number of potential workers.  
In the Netherlands in 2007, the elderly dependency ratio is approximately 25% and is expected 
to rise in the future due to the factors discussed above. Figure 3.2 shows the time series of 
stochastic dependency ratios produced by the PEP program.
10 It can be seen that the 
dependency ratio will undoubtedly increase, however the range of uncertainty increases 
considerably as time goes on. 
 
9 See the values for skewness in the summary statistics Table A.1 in the appendix. 
10 Here the ratio is calculated as the number of individuals between 65 and 99 years-old divided by the number of individuals 
between 20 and 64 years-old.   18 
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10%    19 
Figure 3.3 demonstrates how combining the PEP simulations with GAMMA results in a 
probability distribution of macroeconomic outcomes. Increases in (non-stochastic) labour 
productivity will cause real domestic production to increase by a significant degree over the 
next fifty years. As with the demographic projections, the uncertainty regarding the estimate 
increases as time progresses. However, the uncertainty concerning the GDP projections is less 
than the uncertainty concerning the population projections. For example, the standard deviation 
of the per capita GDP distribution in 2050 is 5.8% of the mean, while the standard deviation of 
the dependency ratio distribution is 15.4% of the mean. Indeed, since the relevant statistic here 
is GDP per capita, the uncertainty of the forecast is largely a reflection of the variance in the 
size of the workforce (those aged between 20 and 64 years) relative to the variance in the size of 
the population, two variables that are quite highly correlated. 
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4  Public expenditures and revenues 
We now direct our attention to the main focus of the article: public finances. The expected 
increase in the elderly dependency ratio will put pressure on public finances in two directions. 
First, a large portion of the government budget is allocated to demographically sensitive 
expenditure categories such as health care and social security, which includes public pensions 
and disability transfers. It turns out that, under even the most optimistic set of assumptions, 
ageing will drive up public expenditures if the cohort profile of these outlays remains unaltered. 
Second, taxes on labour income comprise a substantial share of government income. Thus for a 
given set of tax rates, a relative shrinkage in the tax base (in this case the proportion of 
individuals in the population of working age) decreases revenues as a proportion of GDP. 
Viewed another way, for given revenue requirements, the direct burden of taxation will be 
greater for each worker as will the aggregate excess burden of taxation. We will return to the 
issue of the distortionary effects of taxes in section 5. In this section it is assumed that the tax-
benefit system remains as it is in 2007. 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figures 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate how public expenditures on health care and public pensions will 
develop based on the stochastic demographic scenarios produced by PEP. In each instance, 
demographic developments are sure to increase spending both in absolute terms and as 
percentages of GDP in the coming decades by a significant degree. Additionally, the simulated 
forecast error of the projections is substantial: the standard deviations of the distributions in 
2050 are 13.5% and 15.5% of the means for the GDP shares of health care and public pension 
expenditures respectively.   22 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4.3 illustrates the distribution of stochastic overall public expenditure projections in 
percentages of GDP. Assuming that institutional arrangements remain unaltered, public 
expenditure is sure to rise, with the 80% confidence region estimated at approximately between 
47.2% and 56.3% of GDP in 2058. This considerable range is due to the large portion of public 
expenditures attributable to demographically sensitive items. For example, in 2006, health care 
expenditures comprised approximately 19.3% of the government budget while public pension 
expenditure comprised approximately 10.4% of the budget. According to the baseline 
demographic projection, these shares will increase to 24.9% and 15.4% respectively in 2058. 
Unlike the second-pillar occupational pension system in the Netherlands, public pensions 
are an unfunded pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system: benefits to retirees are financed with the 
concurrent contributions of workers. The health care system is also essentially a PAYG system. 
Since the size of the contribution base in future years is also influenced by demographic 
uncertainty, the public pension and health care systems suffer from ‘double jeopardy’: 
uncertainty with respect to both expenditures and revenues. 
   23 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































10%    24 
Figure 4.4 illustrates the effects of demographic uncertainty on public revenues. Inspection of 
the figure reveals how public revenues are driven by demographic developments, in particular 
fertility and immigration rates. In the simulations, the shocks to the growth rates begin in 2008, 
but only the shocks to the immigration rates are relevant immediately. The impact of 
uncertainty about fertility only becomes significant after about 2028 when the first cohort of 
uncertain size due to fertility rate shocks reaches working age. There is less variation in 
expected revenues than expected expenditures: the standard deviation is 0.83% of the mean 
estimate in 2050 for revenues compared to the standard deviation of 6.0% of the mean estimate 
for expenditures. One could object that these projections assume that future labour participation 
rates within each stochastic simulation are known with certainty. Accounting for this added 
source of uncertainty would indeed increase the forecast error of the revenue projections.   25 
5  Three measures for sustainability 
The simulation results presented so far have assumed that government policies with respect to 
tax rates and public spending will remain indefinitely as they are in 2007. This was done to 
address the following question: accounting for the effects of demographic uncertainty on public 
finances, what is the probability that present fiscal arrangements are sustainable? In order for 
fiscal arrangements to be considered sustainable, the present value of all future revenues must 
equal or exceed the present value of all future expenditures plus the presently existing debt. An 
equivalent condition is that the long-run growth rate of the government’s primary deficit be less 
than the long-run growth rate of GDP. 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5.1 illustrates the development of the primary deficit expressed as a percentage of GDP 
based on the stochastic simulations. Presently, the government budget is in a surplus position. 
However, as public expenditure increases relative to revenues, the fiscal balance will deteriorate 
over time. According to the baseline projection, the long-run primary deficit will level off at 
over 2% of GDP. The probabilistic bounds of the simulations indicate that by 2058, in almost 
80% of the projections, the primary deficit to GDP ratio will reach a steady-state level that is 
positive. Thus, there is approximately only a 20% chance that the primary surplus will remain 
positive in the long run in the current policy environment. 
How can we measure the unsustainability of public finances? One way is simply to calculate 
the immediate and permanent reduction in annual public consumption as a percentage of GDP 
that would set public finances on a sustainable path. This is the measure developed by 
Blanchard et al. (1990) that ultimately stabilizes the debt to GDP ratio. Let us denote this   26 
measure as the expenditure gap. Figure 5.2 presents the outcomes for the expenditure gap for 
the stochastic simulations as a frequency distribution. 
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The mean of the expenditure gap distribution is 2.9% of GDP. Hence, decreasing public 
consumption by 2.9% of GDP (6.3% of primary government expenditure in 2007) will only 
sustain the budget with 50% probability. This estimate compares with the expenditure gap of 
2.7% of GDP in the baseline scenario.
11 The 60% confidence interval for the distribution of the 
expenditure gap lies between 1.0% and 4.7% of GDP and the 80% confidence interval lies 
between .2% and 5.8% of GDP. The probability that the expenditure gap is negative, i.e. that 
there is no sustainability problem, is less than 10%. 
An alternative measure of the unsustainability of public finances is the permanent one-time 
increase in tax rates that sustains the budget. Figures 5.3 and 5.4 illustrate the distribution of the 
required increases for two of the tax rates included in GAMMA: the consumption tax rate
12 and 
the labour income tax rate respectively. Analogous to the expenditure gap, we will call these the 
consumption tax gap and the labour income tax gap. The two tax measures are different from 
the expenditure gap in that they stabilize the tax rate (tax smoothing
13), not tax revenues. Hence, 
the tax measures do not necessarily imply a time-invariant change of the tax revenues to GDP 
ratio. 
 
11 The expenditure gap as reported in Van Ewijk et al. (2006) was 2.6% of GDP. There is a slight difference due to the fact 
that the CBS baseline population projection used in that study can only be approximated within the PEP program. 
12 The consumption tax is not just the V.A.T. It is comprised of all indirect taxes levied on consumers. 
13 Under some conditions, tax smoothing policies may be considered more efficient. See Armstrong et al. (2007) for a 
discussion of this issue in the context of the GAMMA model.   27 
The mean rate increase for the consumption tax is 5.8% points above the baseline level of 
26.4%. The 80% and 60% confidence intervals for the consumption tax gap are .4%points to 
11.5% points and 2.0% points to 9.6% points respectively. The mean rate increase for the 
labour income tax is 8.9% from a baseline level of 29.1%.
14 The 80% and 60% confidence 
intervals for the labour income tax gap are .6% points to 18.2% points and 2.9% points to 
14.5% points respectively. 

































An important difference between Figures 5.3 and 5.4 is the skewness of the frequency 
distributions. Indeed, the frequency distribution of the labour income tax gap is far more 
skewed than that of the consumption tax gap. In this respect, the distribution of the labour 
income tax gap also differs importantly from the distribution of the expenditure gap in Figure 
5.2. The reason is that tax revenues increase less than proportionally with the tax rate. Hence, 
the more distortionary the tax, the more skewed to the right will be the predictive distribution of 
the tax rate. The consumption tax has a fairly broad base since it taxes all individuals regardless 
of whether they work or not and so it is relatively non-distortionary. The labour income tax, 
however, cannot tax retirees, so it imposes a greater distortion on the tax base. 
 
14 The estimate of 8.9% differs from the mean required increase of 13.4% points reported in Armstrong et al. (2007) due to 
the differing assumptions on the development of the population in the baseline projection.   28 

































This can be illustrated by performing a rule of thumb test for the statistical significance of 
skewness. Let Sk be the skewness statistic for a sample distribution and N be the sample size. If 
2 / 6 / 2 < < - N Sk , then the skewness of the data generating process is not significantly 
different from zero. In the case of the consumption tax increase,  31 . 1 / 6 / = N Sk  and in the 
case of the labour income tax increase,  37 . 3 / 6 / = N Sk , so it may be concluded that the 
latter distribution is significantly skewed while the former is not.   29 
6  Concluding Remarks 
The large influence of the population development on public expenditures underscores the need 
to account for demographic uncertainty when making fiscal projections. In general, two 
approaches can be followed: scenario analysis, which more or less is the standard, or stochastic 
simulation analysis. Compared with scenario analysis, stochastic simulation analysis is much 
more demanding, both in terms of time and complexity. It also offers new insights, however. It 
gives an indication of the shape of the predictive distribution of interesting variables – 
demographic, macroeconomic, fiscal – at different points in time. Hence, stochastic simulations 
can offer an indication about the spread, the (non-)symmetry and the mean of the distribution of 
different variables at different points in time. 
This extra information is particularly useful in those cases in which a result relates directly 
to the probability criterion one wants to use. An obvious example in the analysis presented here 
is the decrease in the ratio of public consumption to GDP that is required to avoid the 
unsustainability of public finances. If one requires sustainability to hold with 50% probability, a 
decrease of public consumption by 2.9% of GDP suffices. However, if one requires public 
finances to be sustainable with 80% probability, then a much larger decrease is needed: 4.7% of 
GDP. And if one takes 90% as the probability criterion, the required decrease is even 5.8% of 
GDP. The implication of this is that the preferences of policymakers in general and in particular 
their aversion towards risk come to play a role in the result of the analysis. In particular, the less 
risk policymakers want to take that public finances may eventually turn out to be unsustainable, 
the more substantial are the policy reforms they have to undertake. Under some assumptions 
then, uncertainty combined with risk aversion may call for precautionary saving on part of the 
government (or, equivalently, excessive public debt reduction).
15 
Related, the analysis presented here demonstrates that current fiscal policies may turn out 
not to be unsustainable at all. Indeed, if future mortality rates evolve at lower levels than 
expected, there may actually be room for an increase in the ratio of public consumption to GDP. 
The value added of a stochastic simulation exercise is that the probability that such a scenario 
will materialize can be quantified: about 7.8% in the current analysis. 
Furthermore, in case of nonlinearities, the average outcome of the stochastic simulation 
analysis may be different from the outcome of the most likely future projection. In the case in 
which public expenditures are decreased such as to avoid public finances becoming 
unsustainable, nonlinearities are absent. Indeed, the average of the stochastic simulations, 2.9% 
of GDP, is quite close to the outcome under the baseline scenario, 2.7% of GDP. In case the rate 
of labour income taxation is increased to ensure sustainability, nonlinearities are important, 
 
15 See Armstrong et al. (2007).   30 
though. The baseline projection calculates that this tax rate should be increased by 7.8% points. 
According to stochastic simulation analysis, this tax rate increase can be higher and lower, but 
on average the increase is 8.9% points. 
Overall, our analysis concludes that the uncertainties and their economic impacts are huge. 
Still we feel that the role of uncertainty may be underestimated since our analysis does not 
consider economic uncertainty. The risks posed by uncertainty in productivity growth, rates of 
return and participation rates, among others, should ideally be accounted for. Indeed, the 
argument has been made that the consequences of economic uncertainty outweigh those of 
demographic uncertainty, at least with respect to social welfare (Bonenkamp and Van de Ven 
(2006)). Hence, our results may actually underestimate the role of uncertainty in general. 
Furthermore the model itself is subject to uncertainty; the values of model parameters are not 
more than estimates of their true values. In addition, the analysis does not consider cataclysmic 
events, like pandemics or a third world war. On the other hand, the analysis does not identify 
the effects of economic developments on demographic factors either, which may lead us to 
overestimate the role of uncertainty.   31 
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Appendix: summary statistics 
Table 6.1  Summary statistics - total population (thousands of individuals) 
  2010  2020  2030  2040  2050 
           
Mean  16,667  17,009  17,193  17,115  16,874 
Median  16,667  17,009  17,205  17,098  16,828 
Standard deviation  60.02  325.33  720.34  1204.38  1719.57 
Kurtosis  - 0.31  - 0.14  0.13  0.16  - 0.03 
Skewness  0.00  - 0.05  0.25  0.31  0.21 
 
Table 6.2  Summary statistics - elderly dependency ratio 
  2010  2020  2030  2040  2050 
           
Mean  0.26  0.35  0.43  0.47  0.42 
Median  0.26  0.35  0.43  0.47  0.42 
Standard deviation  0.00  0.01  0.03  0.05  0.07 
Kurtosis  0.51  0.26  0.50  - 0.11  - 0.15 
Skewness  - 0.28  - 0.16  - 0.20  - 0.06  0.03 
 
Table 6.3  Summary statistics - real gross domestic product per capita (thousands of euros) 
  2010  2020  2030  2040  2050 
           
Mean  32.12  36.76  40.82  48.07  58.22 
Median  32.12  36.74  40.84  48.01  58.08 
Standard deviation  0.12  0.44  1.21  2.27  3.39 
Kurtosis  - 0.20  0.71  0.12  - 0.01  0.26 
Skewness  - 0.03  - 0.10  - 0.06  0.06  0.39 
 
Table 6.4  Summary statistics - primary public expenditures (% of GDP) 
  2010  2020  2030  2040  2050 
           
Mean  45.59  48.01  51.57  53.04  52.32 
Median  45.59  47.99  51.59  52.98  52.15 
Standard deviation  0.15  0.43  1.24  2.27  3.13 
Kurtosis  - 0.16  0.24  0.61  0.16  - 0.31 
Skewness  0.13  0.02  0.04  0.13  0.02 
 
Table 6.5  Summary statistics - public health care expenditures (% of GDP) 
  2010  2020  2030  2040  2050 
           
Mean  10.49  10.49  12.45  13.53  13.54 
Median  10.49  10.49  12.43  13.44  13.30 
Standard deviation  0.22  0.22  0.62  1.24  1.82 
Kurtosis  0.08  0.08  0.44  0.00  - 0.17 
Skewness  - 0.01  - 0.01  0.03  0.25  0.30 
   34 
Table 6.6  Summary statistics - public pension expenditures (% of GDP) 
  2010  2020  2030  2040  2050 
           
Mean  5.15  6.71  8.45  9.02  8.34 
Median  5.14  6.72  8.44  9.02  8.26 
Standard deviation  0.04  0.20  0.54  0.96  1.29 
Kurtosis  0.91  0.21  0.54  - 0.08  - 0.17 
Skewness  - 0.05  - 0.17  - 0.19  - 0.06  - 0.01 
 
Table 6.7  Summary statistics - government revenues (% of GDP) 
  2010  2020  2030  2040  2050 
           
Mean  47.90  48.33  50.08  50.42  49.65 
Median  47.90  48.28  50.06  50.42  49.61 
Standard deviation  0.08  0.23  0.42  0.43  0.41 
Kurtosis  - 0.07  0.40  - 0.13  - 0.15  0.19 
Skewness  0.13  0.78  0.17  0.04  0.33 
 
Table 6.8  Summary statistics - primary fiscal deficit (% of GDP) 
  2010  2020  2030  2040  2050 
           
Mean  - 2.31  - 0.32  1.49  2.62  2.68 
Median  - 2.32  - 0.30  1.42  2.65  2.54 
Standard deviation  0.21  0.45  1.32  2.31  3.07 
Kurtosis  - 0.11  0.44  0.49  0.13  - 0.27 
Skewness  - 0.09  - 0.10  0.12  0.19  0.07 
 
 
 